Within days, we’ll witness a string of atrocities across Afghanistan, as the Taliban consolidates power, takes revenge on those who opposed it, and reimposes its sordid, misogynistic rule. The US went into Afghanistan to evict the Taliban not because they were, and are, evil; we went there because they refused to turn over Al Qaeda to stand justice. For this reason, the US deployed the force necessary to evict the Taliban in a truly amazing display of military power.
In the twenty years since that happened, various American Presidents tried and failed to extricate the nation from the war. It was clear to all that the end of an active US military presence in the Hindu Kush (the ancient term for the area we know as the “nation” of Afghanistan) would mean a return of the Taliban. America tried increasing its presence and operations to destroy the Taliban, tried increasing its civil involvement (building schools, writing laws, fostering businesses), tried reducing its military footprint to reduce frictions, and finally tried negotiating directly with the hated Taliban.
In the last five years, the US engaged in a strategy of delay and stalemate. We provided the Afghan government with all the means to succeed while realizing it never could: in effect we propped it up. We built up the Afghan military so it could resist the Taliban, but only if it retained the continued training, air support, and logistics from the US Army. This strategy succeeded by not losing.
Some decried this strategy as defeatist. While the American way of war emphasizes victory, the American public (and its elected officials) no longer have the stomach for the carnage (both to our soldiers and the enemy) that entails. Waiting the Taliban out was always a long-shot, but it had worked so far. Why did we abandon it?
Some said that Afghanistan was America’s longest war. They are either wrong or simply lying. We have been at war with the People’s Democratic Republic of (North) Korea for seventy-plus years. The fact we currently have an armistice that makes people (even South Koreans) think the war is over is testament to how a strategy of waiting the enemy out can succeed. In the meantime, South Korea evolved into a vibrant economy, a manufacturing powerhouse, and even a nascent democracy.
That long “not peace” was not always as peaceful as it is today. At times after the 1951 armistice, the sides exchanged fire and postured. North Korea infiltrated forces across the DMZ to attack targets in the South, and even master-minded an attack on the Blue House and the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987. The US and the Republic of Korea forces suffered casualties, but full-scale combat was avoided. This was a long-term, successful strategy by any measure.
Could this strategy have worked in Afghanistan? It was. Over the past five years, the US drew-down forces and reduced its footprint and operational tempo. We gradually let the Afghan Army take the lead, but were always close at hand in case “things went south” (as we used to say in the Army).
But what of the casualties? I want to be crystal clear here. I was a soldier once; many of my classmates served in Afghanistan, and some died there. No soldier wants to die, and soldiers deserve to know they’re not being sacrificed for no reason. But they do know, from day one in basic training, that they may be sacrificed. Especially in an all-volunteer, professional military, this is a well-understood proposition. Our casualties during the last five years in Afghanistan ran under ten deaths per year. We lose a thousand service-members annually to training accidents. There was no countless-deaths-in-vain reason to withdraw.
But what of the cost? Even with the monumental (and well-documented) corruption, Afghanistan represented a minimal financial burden to the US. In the last few years, we were spending around $50 billion US dollars annually on all activities in Afghanistan; that’s what the entire US government spends in two days. The people who say the cost was too high are the exact same people who said we couldn’t just destroy Al Qaeda and leave the Taliban in charge, we had to create a democracy and build Afghanistan’s civil infrastructure. We tried; it didn’t take, or at least it didn’t take well-enough that Afghani soldiers felt compelled to fight and die to defend it. Maybe it just needed more time, but the clock ran out.
President Trump was wrong to direct a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Like most of his decisions, it went against his own hand-picked advisors, and seemed to be based on his gut instincts or his dislike for the Bush family. He thought he was being decisive in “ending an endless war,” when he simply misunderstood that in combat, only the loser can end a war. He has that decision on his record forever.
Even more execrable is President Biden’s decision to not only withdraw, but to accelerate the timetable. President Biden has seen fit to completely rescind almost every policy President Trump put into place, but here he doubled-down on it. I recall the quote of the Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who said Mr. Biden had the unique position of being ‘the only person wrong on every major foreign policy issue in the past forty years.’ Looks like the string remains unbroken. His administration set arbitrary (and inane) deadlines, like withdrawing by September 11th. Then they advanced them further, apparently realizing all hell was breaking loose but not that such a move would be reminiscent of Saigon, 1975.
Proving that this was a policy decision not fully coordinated with the military, the administration conveniently ignored the fact that thousands of Afghanis (and their families) who worked with the US military had to be evacuated or they would be massacred; the haphazard evacuation continues today. Administration spokesmen blithely bat away the helicopters-on-the-rooftops comparison, while the President orders three-thousand US Marines back into Kabul to evacuate the US Embassy. Guess we’ll use Humvees this time.
Yes, this war dragged on. Yes, the US engaged in mission creep, and was never willing to destroy the Taliban. Yes, the US military was going to keep sending soldiers home draped in coffins as long as this war continued. No, there was no compelling need for President Trump’s rash decision, nor President Biden’s inexcusable continuation of it. No, we were not bleeding ourselves dry outside Kandahar, nor were we bankrupting the nation’s treasure bankrolling corrupt Afghan officials. No, this loss was not inevitable. It was a choice.
As I said before–and as it has always been–the losers determine when a war ends. There is no dignity in this withdrawal, whether or not we see people clinging to helicopter skids. Our military did exactly what it was asked to do. This “L” is on our Leaders, who lost hope, lacked fortitude, and thought they could finesse it. There will be no finesse in Kabul soon, only peace, the peace that comes with the grave.
Our leaders always knew, from Day One, what would happen if the Taliban returned. They now share this legacy.
Amen !!!!!
Pat, I volunteered for an active duty combat tour in Afghanistan in 2007 as a 50 year old reserve intelligence officer. I gave this mission a year of my life, put my body at risk, stressed my marriage, and denied my kids their father. By the time I left we had made a measurable difference in insurgent targeting. Now, to see us just slink away in the middle of the night while the Taliban returns the country to medieval barbarism is just shameful.
Barry Zulauf
Pat, it’s a terrible end to 20 years of failure. We lost the war in 2002, when the Bush team started shifting resources away for their dishonest war in Iraq. Successive “experts” in four administrations have been kidding themselves and the American people on our ability to “win” there. I hope we learn from this colossal failure, but I’m doubtful. Sad…
I don’t think Iraq played the role you think it did. The entire US Army (USA, USAR, USARNG) and the Marine Corps could not pacify Afghanistan in the classic sense.We never should have moved on to nation-building, which was always a losing proposition. But what of the strategy change five years ago? How was it not working? And why the sudden shift by Trump/Biden? How is that justified?
Could not disagree with you more this time my friend. We lost this one in 2002-2003 when our focus shifted. I was on the ground and the Afghans in charge knew what was coming even then—just a matter of when. We handed this one over to our children, unfortunately, and they also knew the outcome after numerous repeat engagements. Times up and we’ll all hold our breath as the end unfolds.
Not sure how much we disagree. Everyone always knew that without the US support, the Afghan government was doomed. Just like everyone knew that the ROK was doomed from 1953 till about 1990. Only later did the ROK military and government become (arguably) able to defend itself. We adopted the correct strategy in Afghanistan five years ago: air and logistics support, training, SF, and the war stalemated. Only when we dropped our support as President Trump began direct negotiations did it begin to unravel.
Just a very sad situation and I’m holding my breath for personal reasons. Looking toward 9 Sep and the anniversary of the Masood assassination attempt (believe he succumbed 12 Sep). I think we’ll be done.
Pat, just got this blog entry from Don Mathis. Great to see you are still “in the game” and thinking about the issues of the day. Hope you and yours are safe & sound and enjoying life in…Mexico?
Still in Mexico, and definitely still loving it! Thanks for checking in, sir!
I have mixed feelings about this. I’m glad to see there is a serious effort underway to get Afghans who helped us out of harm’s way.
I think its obvious that every administration since Bush 43 screwed up when it came to Afghanistan. Actually, I think it goes further back. During Reagan’s administration, people who knew what was happening among the factions we lumped together as Mujahideen warned against hanging our hat on Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s peg. But General Zia liked Hekmatyar, as did Charlie Wilson’s friend, Joanne Heering, who liked Hekmatyar’s religious fervor when it came to fighting godless commies. Zia was the one who really mattered though, since the US wanted a middleman and Zia wanted to be that guy who would send arms into Afghanistan to the faction he favored. I think a lot of folks in Bush 41’s and Clinton’s administration’s were dumbfounded to learn that some of the Mujahideen and their Arab allies hated us as much as they did the Soviets. They were just happy to use us.
There is a soliloquy in Kim, in which Mahbub Ali, a Pashtun, opines on who a Pashtun trusts more to less in order — and hates, less to more, in order. It’s something anyone thinking about our involvement should have read.
It may be that all of our horses and all our men couldn’t have put Afganistan together again. Still, we (and they) paid a price when we took our focus off the country after 1989, and again in 2002. We didn’t have the military force needed to “fix” the country, but we might have had the Allies both inside and outside the country, and the diplomatic and economic resources to make a difference.
From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban were able to sieze and hold power because Najibullah had been abandoned by Russia and his internal allies, the country was torn apart by warlords and the only counterweight to the Taliban after 1996 was the Northern Alliance who were trying to hold ground in the Tajik lands in the North. But the Taliban were disorganized and poor at command and control, so they folded like cheap lawn chairs when confronted with US forces and a well-equipped and advised Northern Alliance. When we shifted focus, attention and resources to Iraq, the Taliban took the lessons they learned from their defeat and used their time wisely to reorganize into a government and army in exile. Had we maintained pressure on them, it might have gone differently.
I recall Richard Armitage, around 2012, riffing on Bismark, saying that Afghanistan wasn’t worth the life of a single Texas Infantryman.
I also recall thinking a lot about Clausewitz writing that the most important thing to know before going to war is “the value of the object.” And, when the cost exceeds the value, it behooves one to reconsider what they are doing . I would submit that after Decembef 2001, we stopped assessing the value of the object; our mission. Indeed we may have never actually figured it out at all.
Trump set the stage for our exit, be it honorable or just “cuttin’ and runnin’ with honor.” Biden, who has argued for years that Afghanistan was a strategic sink hole, wasn’t inclined to reverse the agreement (be it wise or not) that Trump made with the Taliban.
So, we’re ending the comedy of errors and getting ready for the tragedy. I just hope we can get our friends to safety. And I suppose it can’t hurt to pray for those left behind.
I will be pleased when there are no more conventional American troops in Afghanistan. It turned into a quagmire without a purpose. There might be a smarter way to withdraw, but it is past time. In the past 20 years, we confirmed what the English and the Soviets had showed us, that Afghanistan cannot be tamed. We also confirmed what we have demonstrated in the past, that freedom and democracy cannot be force fed. They must be demanded and embraced by the people. I am saddened by the prospects of the Afghan people.
Pat, this was a very informed and informative assessment, thank you. The comparison of OCO to non-OCO speaks volumes yet I do not recall every hearing or reading this in any “news”. I am not a military anything, and I have wondered since the US entered what they hoped to gain. Britain failed twice I think, all the way back to the 1840s or so, as did the USSR. And Wikipedia has a long list of those who tried to rule Afghanistan, back to the Persians. But not my area of strength for sure. What I also (perhaps naively) wonder is why there is not a way for the rest of the world to collectively put a stop to the horrors of the Taliban, though I suppose if that were possible even on a common will level, there would be many places to go “set things right”, even in Africa alone. Some rambling from me, but thanks for the analysis.