Within days, we’ll witness a string of atrocities across Afghanistan, as the Taliban consolidates power, takes revenge on those who opposed it, and reimposes its sordid, misogynistic rule. The US went into Afghanistan to evict the Taliban not because they were, and are, evil; we went there because they refused to turn over Al Qaeda to stand justice. For this reason, the US deployed the force necessary to evict the Taliban in a truly amazing display of military power.
In the twenty years since that happened, various American Presidents tried and failed to extricate the nation from the war. It was clear to all that the end of an active US military presence in the Hindu Kush (the ancient term for the area we know as the “nation” of Afghanistan) would mean a return of the Taliban. America tried increasing its presence and operations to destroy the Taliban, tried increasing its civil involvement (building schools, writing laws, fostering businesses), tried reducing its military footprint to reduce frictions, and finally tried negotiating directly with the hated Taliban.
In the last five years, the US engaged in a strategy of delay and stalemate. We provided the Afghan government with all the means to succeed while realizing it never could: in effect we propped it up. We built up the Afghan military so it could resist the Taliban, but only if it retained the continued training, air support, and logistics from the US Army. This strategy succeeded by not losing.
Some decried this strategy as defeatist. While the American way of war emphasizes victory, the American public (and its elected officials) no longer have the stomach for the carnage (both to our soldiers and the enemy) that entails. Waiting the Taliban out was always a long-shot, but it had worked so far. Why did we abandon it?
Some said that Afghanistan was America’s longest war. They are either wrong or simply lying. We have been at war with the People’s Democratic Republic of (North) Korea for seventy-plus years. The fact we currently have an armistice that makes people (even South Koreans) think the war is over is testament to how a strategy of waiting the enemy out can succeed. In the meantime, South Korea evolved into a vibrant economy, a manufacturing powerhouse, and even a nascent democracy.
That long “not peace” was not always as peaceful as it is today. At times after the 1951 armistice, the sides exchanged fire and postured. North Korea infiltrated forces across the DMZ to attack targets in the South, and even master-minded an attack on the Blue House and the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987. The US and the Republic of Korea forces suffered casualties, but full-scale combat was avoided. This was a long-term, successful strategy by any measure.
Could this strategy have worked in Afghanistan? It was. Over the past five years, the US drew-down forces and reduced its footprint and operational tempo. We gradually let the Afghan Army take the lead, but were always close at hand in case “things went south” (as we used to say in the Army).
But what of the casualties? I want to be crystal clear here. I was a soldier once; many of my classmates served in Afghanistan, and some died there. No soldier wants to die, and soldiers deserve to know they’re not being sacrificed for no reason. But they do know, from day one in basic training, that they may be sacrificed. Especially in an all-volunteer, professional military, this is a well-understood proposition. Our casualties during the last five years in Afghanistan ran under ten deaths per year. We lose a thousand service-members annually to training accidents. There was no countless-deaths-in-vain reason to withdraw.
But what of the cost? Even with the monumental (and well-documented) corruption, Afghanistan represented a minimal financial burden to the US. In the last few years, we were spending around $50 billion US dollars annually on all activities in Afghanistan; that’s what the entire US government spends in two days. The people who say the cost was too high are the exact same people who said we couldn’t just destroy Al Qaeda and leave the Taliban in charge, we had to create a democracy and build Afghanistan’s civil infrastructure. We tried; it didn’t take, or at least it didn’t take well-enough that Afghani soldiers felt compelled to fight and die to defend it. Maybe it just needed more time, but the clock ran out.
President Trump was wrong to direct a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Like most of his decisions, it went against his own hand-picked advisors, and seemed to be based on his gut instincts or his dislike for the Bush family. He thought he was being decisive in “ending an endless war,” when he simply misunderstood that in combat, only the loser can end a war. He has that decision on his record forever.
Even more execrable is President Biden’s decision to not only withdraw, but to accelerate the timetable. President Biden has seen fit to completely rescind almost every policy President Trump put into place, but here he doubled-down on it. I recall the quote of the Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who said Mr. Biden had the unique position of being ‘the only person wrong on every major foreign policy issue in the past forty years.’ Looks like the string remains unbroken. His administration set arbitrary (and inane) deadlines, like withdrawing by September 11th. Then they advanced them further, apparently realizing all hell was breaking loose but not that such a move would be reminiscent of Saigon, 1975.
Proving that this was a policy decision not fully coordinated with the military, the administration conveniently ignored the fact that thousands of Afghanis (and their families) who worked with the US military had to be evacuated or they would be massacred; the haphazard evacuation continues today. Administration spokesmen blithely bat away the helicopters-on-the-rooftops comparison, while the President orders three-thousand US Marines back into Kabul to evacuate the US Embassy. Guess we’ll use Humvees this time.
Yes, this war dragged on. Yes, the US engaged in mission creep, and was never willing to destroy the Taliban. Yes, the US military was going to keep sending soldiers home draped in coffins as long as this war continued. No, there was no compelling need for President Trump’s rash decision, nor President Biden’s inexcusable continuation of it. No, we were not bleeding ourselves dry outside Kandahar, nor were we bankrupting the nation’s treasure bankrolling corrupt Afghan officials. No, this loss was not inevitable. It was a choice.
As I said before–and as it has always been–the losers determine when a war ends. There is no dignity in this withdrawal, whether or not we see people clinging to helicopter skids. Our military did exactly what it was asked to do. This “L” is on our Leaders, who lost hope, lacked fortitude, and thought they could finesse it. There will be no finesse in Kabul soon, only peace, the peace that comes with the grave.
Our leaders always knew, from Day One, what would happen if the Taliban returned. They now share this legacy.