Putin’s Infinity War

No doubt my well-informed friends have kept up with the news of Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine. The major media sources have done a fair-to-good job of reporting on this conflict, which has involved more public information than any previous conflict to date. I’ve refrained from blogging about it (except in passing), but perhaps it’s time to visit it with an eye to what’s really going on on the ground, and what it all means.

I must admit to some professional regret about this war, or as Putin calls it, his “special military operation.” I began my short military career facing off along the Iron Curtain in (then-West) Germany, and specialized in analyzing first the Red Army and second Soviet military doctrine. So I spent undue hours reading what the Soviets wrote, watching their military exercises, and preparing how to defeat them. Alas, I was blessed to not have to use my skills and expertise in actual war, the Soviet Union climbed aboard the dust-heap of history, and I moved on to other things.

What I learned about the Soviet Army remains true about today’s Russian Army. First, they are excellent theorists. In the 1960s, when computers weren’t really a thing yet, Russian military thinkers devised a concept called the reconnaissance-strike complex: an integrated set of command, sensors, and weapons which would enable immediate, accurate fire on any target. They were spot on, but never had the technology or leadership to attempt it. They were planning to employ the concept against Ukraine.

Second, when the Russians had tried to emulate the concept by discarding their mostly conscript force, they did it on the cheap, and kept the brutal discipline, lack of initiative, and willingness to suffer casualties which were their hallmark. There were signs that nothing had changed (Chechnya, for example), but there were successful campaigns, too, like those in Syria and later in Crimea. In the end, you can’t just add some technology to a rotten force and expect miracles.

The real wild card in the war was (and remains) the Ukrainian military. Now it evolved from the same Soviet sources, with similar equipment and doctrine. But in the most recent years, it had been acquiring western military equipment and training. How much had changed? How willing would they be to die (everybody is willing to fight; what matters is who is willing to die)? Most observers (myself included) didn’t give them much of a chance. All I can say is “Slava Ukraini!“

The result? Russia sought a coup de main (in current US military parlance, a “thunder run“): a bold, lightning-fast strike at Kyiv, which would paralyze the Ukrainian forces, decapitate the government, and result in the enemy’s collapse. It sounds great, if it works. Instead, the Ukrainians fought, the Russians diddled, and it resulted in a slug-fest continuing still a year on.

The facts? Russia controls most of the Ukrainian territory where people consider themselves ethnically Russian or speak primarily Russian. This includes most of the Black Sea coast and a land corridor to Crimea (which Russia previously annexed: more on that later). The Ukrainians not only defeated the initial strike on Kyiv, they pushed several of the routes of advance back to the Russian border, but progress in the main battle area near the Don river is measured in meters, not miles. Both sides have settled into a grinding war of attrition using artillery and small infantry tactics. Which is to Russia’s advantage in the long run.

And this war will be a long run. In fact, I would argue it’s wrong to call it a war. It’s really a long, single campaign in what I would call Putin’s Infinity War. Putin began this war twenty years ago after speaking and writing about NATO’s betrayal of Russia. He was fundamentally wrong: NATO owed Russia nothing, and nothing NATO ever did threatened post cold-war Russia. But Putin could not stand the loss of Russian prestige which resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union (he called it the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century”), and he seized upon that to seek multiple opportunities to re-assert Russia’s prerogatives. Putin violently put down separatist movements and threatened neighboring Georgia. He sent military forces to prop up client states in Central Asia and Syria, support an ethnic Russian nationalist uprising in the Donbas (a region in Ukraine), and occupy the Crimea. The West never noticed, or when it did, it responded with desultory political moves. Putin told the Russian people that NATO was waging war against Russia, and now he has used NATO support for Ukraine as proof for his lie.

It is a lie, but it is a useful one. Putin acted the bully and when the West refused to respond to his provocations, they became worse (shades of Hitler, 1938). Putin sensed weakness in Western leaders: Germany’s Angela Merkel sought Russia’s gas via the Nordstream pipeline. France’s Macron wanted to negotiate Ukraine’s future. Joe Biden was Vice President to President Obama when Putin occupied Crimea and nothing happened. Putin misjudged Western resolve: Biden has done very well pulling NATO together, the Germans have done a verbal about-face (although they have yet to begin rearming), and even the French are staying in line.

Does the US have a vital national interest in a free-and-independent Ukraine? Yes. There is nothing wrong with questioning “why?”, “for how long?”, or even “with what?” about our support, but the answers are still convincing. America built an international system with a series of rules that served to keep the world largely free of interstate conflict during the very tense Cold War. This worked to our national advantage: fewer deaths, more development, better quality of life. Putin has directly challenged that system, and if his challenge stands, we return to a world where China thinks it can invade Taiwan, North Korea thinks it can invade the South, Iran thinks it can attack Israel. All of which would cost American blood and treasure. It’s our system, and we must be the leader in defending it.

I was very critical of President Biden’s initial policy regarding the invasion, as I saw it as too timid, and I believed it would only grow more lukewarm over time. During a long Washington career, Biden had the unique standing of having been wrong time-and-again on foreign policy: he was against the raid that killed Bin Laden (“better to wait”), he was against the first Gulf War (“What vital interests of the United States justify sending Americans to their deaths in the sands of Saudi Arabia?”), and he was for the second (“taking this son of a bitch down was the only way.”). I had ample evidence, but I was wrong. He has consistently responded with appropriate, increasing support, while deftly handling the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden, and not providing Putin the provocation he desires.

As to the sanctions, they are responsible, targeted, and meaningful . . . but not decisive. The shock which destabilized the Ruble has subsided. While the vast majority of UN member states vote with the US and against Russia on this issue, most of the world does not abide by the sanctions. China ignores them, as does India, North Korea, Iran, much of Africa and South America, even Mexico. They will hurt Russia, but in the end neither the Russian Army nor the Putin regime will fail because of sanctions.

Putin has been fighting us for twenty years; only last year did we realize it. Putin’s entire reputation as a strong leader is based on his continuing to enlarge the Russian sphere of influence, not whether he keeps McDonald’s in Moscow or even minimizes casualty lists. He has no fall-back plan: it is victory or death (for him literally, for Russia figuratively). He can pause, negotiate, even reduce his immediate goals, but only for a short time. The challenge is that NATO will never enter the conflict formally, so the actual battle for Ukraine is between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine will run out of ammunition, soldiers, and money before Russia does, even when including all the support the West has given Ukraine. That would not be the case if all current trends continue. But at some point, the costs (real and imagined) will begin to outweigh the benefits. If you doubt this, remember that the US withdrew from Afghanistan after twenty years, knowing what would inevitably happen (although we were surprised at how fast), and all because of military casualty totals which were less than the number of servicemen and women we lose annually to training accidents. National will is a fickle thing.

Where does that leave us? Russia’s current human-wave assault on Bakhmut has stalled, and now we await Ukraine’s promised counterattack. Whether they have the equipment, training, and manpower for a major attack is simply beyond telling right now. They proved resourceful by surprising the Russians last year, and they’ll need to do it again. They have fewer options now: the front line has settled along the Russian-Ukrainian border in some places, and do the Ukrainians dare attack across it? Elsewhere, the Russians have learned one lesson from last year and prepared defensive lines and belts behind their forward troops, to assist in repelling any Ukrainian incursions. Attacks are generally more costly for the attackers, and exploiting initial success requires even more forces. I would expect some tactical victories, but no major operational ones for Ukraine this year.

My prognosis? Remember, this war started years ago, and it will continue for years to come. Ukraine is not strong enough to end it, and Putin can’t and won’t. Putin still believes he has time on his side: Moscow is calm, the economy still functions, and there is no shortage of draftees, contrary to some reports. He was certainly surprised by the strength and resolve of NATO, but he still believes it will wane. Putin only needs a decline in NATO support, not a collapse. Ukraine requires complete commitment. Will Ukraine end up being like South Korea, where America (and the UN) still stay the course seventy-three years later? Or Afghanistan, where a mere twenty years was sufficient to cause a loss of affection (despite the certainty of the evil which would and did prevail)? I don’t know, but Putin certainly is not mad to believe it is the latter case.

Finally, what to make of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling? Much of this is for show, intended to scare the Western public (and thereby freeze NATO) more than anything else. But as I noted earlier, Putin’s Infinity War is an existential one for him. If the Russian army were to collapse, I would not put it past Putin to use some tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. If his government looked set to fall, I would not rule out his lobbing a nuclear armed missile or two at the West (Berlin and New York, for the record). In his eyes, smoldering rubble would salvage a draw in the contest between East and West.