The 2003 Iraq Invasion, Twenty Years on

Twenty years back, I was involved in the Washington, DC, policy process. This was in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the ongoing sanctions aimed at containing Saddam Hussein, and the controversy over Iraq’s (imagined) weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yesterday the New York Times published a series of retrospective articles, including one entitled “20 Years On, a Question Lingers About Iraq: Why Did the U.S. Invade?” It is not bad as far as it goes, but fails to review where-we-were-when the decisions were made, so it repeats certain myths. For example:

• Certain GOP neoconservatives saw the US as the sole remaining superpower, free to remake the world as it willed
• Others imagined a nefarious link between Saddam and al Qaeda
• President Bush knew there were no WMD, but insisted there were as an excuse to invade Iraq (hence the progressive pop chant “Bush lied, people died!”)
• Sanctions successfully contained Saddam, so there was no need for an invasion
• American leaders expected the Iraqis to welcome the US military as liberators and were surprised by Iraqi antagonism
• and most ridiculously, the US invaded to control Iraq’s oil. I won’t dignify this charge with any further comment. There never was any evidence to this theory.

Like all good myths, there is an element of truth to the rest of these. But they miss the point when asked to explain “why we invaded?” and they hide other far more important points.

Let’s set the way-back machine to early September 2001, years before the invasion but just days after the terror attacks. No one, not even the most neo-conservative conservative, saw the US as so powerful it could do as it pleased. Perhaps on September 10th they did, but America was a wounded animal on the 12th, angry and suspicious and hurt.

Some (including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) immediately suspected that Iraq was behind 9/11 somehow, as it was widely believed no ragtag group of terrorists could have mounted such coordinated attacks. But al Qaeda did, and while some policy-types continued to suggest Iraq was involved, they never succeeded in convincing any of the senior policy-makers. What they did succeed in doing was raising suspicions: even if Iraq was not involved, would Saddam be willing to share his WMD with al Qaeda now that they were a proven threat to the West? People forget how justifiably paranoid America was after 9/11, and it was no stretch to assume Saddam might do something as dangerous as pass along WMD. After all, he has used chemical weapons against both Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war, and against Kurdish civilians during a revolt! In retrospect, this all seems outlandish, because we know now that Saddam had no WMD. But we didn’t know that then: not the United Nations, not the Five Eyes Intelligence Services, and not President Bush.

Bush ’43 was an avid consumer of intelligence analysis and reporting, and he had a great deal of trust in the US intelligence community. He inherited that relationship from his father, Bush ’41, who had led the CIA and was perhaps the most knowledgeable intelligence consumer ever to sit behind the Resolute desk in the Oval Office. For the variety of reasons well-studied and explained in the Select Committee Report On Iraqi WMD, everyone (and I mean everyone) assumed Saddam had WMD when in fact he did not. It’s easy to forget that now, and to reason as if everyone should have known he did not have WMD.

Which is not to say the imaginary WMD did not play an important role. Because everyone thought he had them, and yet Saddam refused to admit to it, WMD became the best argument for removing him from power. And Bush ’43 didn’t need much of an excuse. He had explicitly campaigned on a promise to remove Saddam. Why? Because Saddam’s continued rule had frozen US Middle East policy in an untenable position. We had stationed protective US military forces in Saudi Arabia–the Muslim holy land. Radical clerics like Osama bin Laden had always pointed out the hypocrisy and corruption of the House of Saud, but now they had direct evidence of apostasy: inviting the hated crusaders into the land of Mecca and Medina. What once seemed like a lunatic raving from a cave now seemed more like a prophet to thousands of Saudi believers, especially nineteen who agreed to do something about it on September 11th, 2001.

The problem of US troops on the Saudi peninsula was well understood in policy circles. We did everything we could (build bases, preposition equipment, give the Saudis advanced weapons and training) to prepare if the US needed to fight a war there, but we always avoided sending troops, because all the experts agreed it would be a casus belli for jihad. Bush ’41 finally sent troops to evict Saddam from Kuwait, but he thought the Kurds and Shi’ites would revolt and overthrow Saddam after the First Gulf War back in 1991. It didn’t happen. Saddam’s longevity despite revolts and sanctions left the US with a decades-long troop presence in the one place they couldn’t be: Saudi Arabia.

The other forgotten element is that sanctions were not working, they were dying. The French had publicly called to end them in 1999. The Russians were circumventing them. The Oil-for-Food program undercut the other sanctions. Finally, well-meaning humanitarian organizations around the world cited bogus statistics provided by Saddam about the effects of sanctions on the poor people of Iraq. It was only after the war ended and Saddam was gone that authoritative studies showed that Saddam had simply made up the claim that half a million Iraqi babies died due to sanctions. So sanctions were in the process of ending, not succeeding.

Did the US expect to be welcomed with open arms? While they did not expect the degree of hostility which resulted, few thought the US troops would be universally welcomed. For starters, there were thousands of committed Ba’athists (Saddam’s party) who had everything to lose. Iran was glad to see Saddam neutralized, and welcomed the chance to incite Iraqi Shi’ites (coreligionists) to rise up and kill Americans. Average Iraqis had a wait-and-see attitude which quickly soured on the American occupation. Only the Kurds really wanted us there, even though we had left them to their fate once before, and would do so again.

Did the occupation have to go as poorly as it did? No. The factors I just listed could have been neutralized if the US (1) did a proper job of de-Ba’athification, (2) and deployed sufficient forces for occupation duty. The American government had great examples of how to run the occupation, rebuilding, and construction of an enemy territory. We literally wrote volumes of books on it based on Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Both were far more destroyed and far more hostile to the American occupation than Iraq ever could be, and yet modern Germany and Japan stand as grand testimony to doing things right.

What our experience told us was we needed to distinguish between those Ba’athists who were truly evil people and the larger majority who simply went-along-to-get-along (the same problem we faced with the Germans and the Nazi Party). It also told us we needed a sufficiently large occupation force to ensure people felt under the control of the occupying power: a visible presence in the streets, re-assuring the populace that they were safe while intimidating anyone thinking of rising up against it.

We ignored our own experience. Partly this was based on the notion we had to get US troops out of the area quickly (a real issue, but after twenty years, one that should have been more carefully considered.) Unfortunately, some senior Defense Department officials had bought into the US Air Force’s notion of a “Shock & Awe” campaign. This theory, which had been put forward in different terms by air-power enthusiasts since the dawn of human flight, suggested that Iraq could be conquered by a short, unrelenting and precise campaign of aerial bombardment that would kill Saddam and his sons, paralyze their military and lead the Iraqis to quit resisting. Air power had never accomplished this before (not in World War II, nor in Korea, nor Vietnam), but it had come close in the First Gulf War, and all it needed was another chance with the proper emphasis and the improved technology the US now had. Not only that, but a Shock and Awe campaign solved the occupation problem: no need for massive amounts of troops. The US could raid Iraq like a store-front smash-n-grab: smash the army, kill Hussein, and be off in an instant, with no lingering troop commitment. Voices like Secretary of State Colin Powell, a distinguished Army General who said “you break it (Iraq), you fix it” were ignored.

So the US government went in with a light military ground force, capable of defeating and ousting Saddam but not occupying Iraq. They accomplished the military mission quickly and efficiently, but chaos soon reigned as all the forces I mentioned earlier came out to play. Meanwhile, the political officials sent over to stabilize the situation issued a blanket de-Bat’athification order, making anyone associated with the movement ineligible for further government service and eliminating the Iraqi army, removing any reason for them to cooperate, and overnight turning them into the biggest insurgent force in the country. Finally, back in Washington, policy officials who were still angry about the many countries (including US allies) who refused to support the invasion made the intemperate decision to restrict Iraqi rebuilding (and its profits) to those nations who participated in the invasion. There was a moment there when Russia, China, France and many other countries could have been enticed to participate in the occupation, if given the chance to benefit from the reconstruction. Instead, we shut them out, guaranteeing it was all on us, just as Secretary Powell had warned.

So, why did the US invade Iraq? Because “containing” Saddam required US military forces in Saudi Arabia, which had brought about a worse situation in the form of a popular Islamic Jihad we still face today, twenty years later. Sanctions had restrained him, but international will to continue those sanctions was greatly weakening. Saddam’s WMD proved a useful excuse to the world, but in the end, was the ultimate MacGuffin. Was the US involvement destined to fail? It succeeded in the near term and accomplished its military objectives. The US ignored its own successful experiences in favor of an unproven theory, then compounded the error with bad political decisions regarding both the Iraqis and reconstruction. Even with all that, American casualties had stabilized at a low level by 2008.

We’ll never know the counterfactual case if Saddam had not been hanged, had outlasted sanctions and rebuilt his WMD (he absolutely admitted his intent to do so). Certainly we would still have tens of thousands more US troops in Saudi Arabia, and the threat of what Saddam might do next. To my mind, it was the right policy decision, poorly executed, rather than a lie, a hoax, or a colossal failure.