War & Morality

As I write this, Israel is pounding the Gaza strip with munitions, and starting its ground offensive into the tiny, heavily-urbanized area. Several Arab states, news networks, and pro-Palestinian groups have already called these actions “war crimes.” Others have stated the current conflict must take account of the decades of Israeli “occupation” of formerly Palestinian territory, as well as the degraded treatment of the Palestinian people therein. The UN Secretary General opined people need to understand “the context” of the current war. A US State Department employee resigned in protest over the US provision of weapons to Israel, citing the fact such weapons “could be used for war crimes.” And even the President of the United States, while maintaining total support for Israel’s right to self-defense, has voiced “concerns” over the conduct of ground operations in the Gaza strip.

The Catholic theologians (and Saints) Augustine and Thomas Aquinas put forward the basic principles of Just War theory, Augustine in the 5th century later embellished by Aquinas in the 12th. Those principles have stood the test of time, being codified in various international treaties and conventions. There are two fundamental questions: whether the war itself is “just” and whether the war is being conducted “justly.” The points are independent: you can fight a just war unjustly, and you can fight an unjust war justly. Let’s examine whether Israel is engaged in a just war, and whether it is conducting it “justly.”

The principles of a just war (jus ad bellum, for those who had Latin inflicted upon them) are thus:

• Just Cause. The damage inflicted by the aggressor must be lasting, grave and certain. Here there is little doubt that the terror attack of October 7th qualifies.
• Proper Authority. War may only be declared by a legitimate government on behalf of its people. The Israeli administration at the moment of the attacks was quite divisive, but in a true show of support, all sides formed a national unity government to declare and conduct the war.
• Right Intention. The purpose of the war must be the stated intention, not masking another motivation. This is always tricky. The stated purpose of Israel’s war is to eliminate Hamas, and that would qualify as just. Some claim Israel really wants to ethnically cleanse Gaza, or kill Palestinians, citing remarks by some Israeli officials. The final answer here must wait, but the stated intent suffices in the meantime.
• Last resort. All peaceful alternatives must be exhausted, ineffective, or impractical. Given that Israel has left Hamas to run Gaza for more than a decade of missile barrages and terror attacks, resulting in only more of the same, this point is met.
• Proportionality. The good achieved must not be outweighed by the harm done. Another tricky one. Ending Hamas’ reign of terror for Israel AND for the Palestinians in Gaza is a pretty big deal, but it can’t come at the cost of destroying all of Gaza, either. Israel has not suggested the latter, so they again meet the standard. But it must also be understood that this criterion is not some absolute check on military force: there is no such thing as a hostage-veto or an innocent victim-veto on war.
• Probability of success. There must be a reasonable chance of achieving the war’s stated purpose. Few doubt the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) abilities here; many question the relative costs.

By these standards, Israel is engaging in a just war. This determination can be reviewed, for example, if a secret Israeli memo came to light calling for the eradication of the Palestinian people rather than simply Hamas. But claiming this is their intent is insufficient.

But is Israel conducting this war justly? Here are the criteria for fighting a war justly (jus in bello):

• Discrimination. Armies should fight armies, and strive not to intentionally inflict harm on non-combatants. The IDF directed Palestinians to evacuate the northern half of the Gaza strip. While many humanitarian organizations decried the 48 hour deadline Israel announced, in fact the IDF waited weeks before ground operations commenced. Notifying civilians where they should not be also tells Hamas where the attack will come, so the IDF has gone above and beyond initially. Compare that to Hamas, which ordered Palestinians to stay in place. What about the thousands of IDF strikes in Gaza since the October 7th terrorist attack? Hamas (and other groups) have continued to launch rockets and missiles in response, so they retain some offensive capability. Video footage shows the results, but also attests to the fact that the Israelis are using precision-strike munitions to take down individual buildings. Even the pattern of destruction demonstrates the bombings are part of a coordinated effort to assist the ground operation, establish a new buffer zone, and isolate Hamas fighters, all legitimate targets. So the IDF is currently meeting this standard for fighting justly.
• Due proportion. Combatants must use only the means necessary to achieve their objectives. This principle is best explained at the extreme. For example, the IDF almost certainly has tactical nuclear weapons. They could blast Hamas and the entire Gaza strip into nothingness with a round or two, accomplishing their stated objective of eliminating Hamas but at an inhumane cost in innocent life. In the real world, this principle is much more debatable. What about the 8,000+ (and growing) list of Palestinians who have already been killed since October 7th? First off, this total is supplied by the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. Many aid agencies claim that past data provided by Hamas has been accurate. There are two problems with this claim. First, the data does not indicate if the deceased were members of Hamas: so it mixes innocent civilians with legitimate military targets. Second, this same ministry immediately blamed the IDF for the explosion at the al-Ahli Arab Hospital, claiming 500 people died. The ministry provided no evidence of the casualties, nor of the bomb. Subsequent analysis by several news organizations and the US Intelligence Community concluded the explosion was not an IDF strike, was most likely caused by a malfunctioning Palestinian rocket, and the casualty counts were inflated.

During the initial attack on October 7th, over 1,200 Jews were killed and over 4,200 were injured. Even accepting the Hamas data, the IDF has thus far met the standard of proportionality. The debate about proportionality will be an ongoing one as the war continues.

Even if Israel has met the technical standards for starting a just war and is currently fighting it justly, what about the larger claims of Israeli occupation and mistreatment of the Palestinians? Much is made of the Israeli total blockade of Gaza. However, international law permits Israel to ensure no military resources enter Gaza, and Hamas admits it has food and fuel stockpiles which it is not sharing with the Palestinians. Hamas has also rejected US and Israeli offers of humanitarian aid. Likewise, Israel does not control the flow of refugees out of Gaza; Egypt does, as does Hamas. No Arab nation has (as of yet) agreed to accept Palestinian refugees from Gaza. One further point which merits consideration: Hamas has denied that its attackers committed any atrocities on October 7th, despite video evidence to the contrary. Hamas further claims that “average Palestinians” rose up on October 7th and took revenge on the Jews, committing the atrocities shown in the videos. So those who claim Hamas is trustworthy must admit that “average Palestinians” perhaps are not as peace-loving as depicted by some. Finally, Hamas admits it holds hundreds of innocent hostages in violation of international law.

How will the IDF ground attack play out? As this map shows, the IDF will most likely occupy the area around the wadi al Gaza, which splits the Gaza strip in two. They will then reduce (military term) the area north of the wadi by destroying any remaining Hamas fighters, who will be cut-off from Hamas supplies and leadership south of the wadi. Once Hamas in this area is destroyed, Israel will declare this northern half of Gaza as a demilitarized zone under international authority (probably inviting the UN to administer it). Palestinians would be invited to return to this area, after being checked for Hamas affiliation. Israel will establish a new border zone, probably about two kilometers into the Gaza strip, which the IDF will treat as a free-fire zone complete with mines, obstacles, and walls (several layers). Any person or thing moving into this zone will be targeted and eliminated. All this could take months.

What happens after that depends on how the first phase goes. Does Israel then reduce the southern portion of Gaza, up to the Egyptian border? If the first phase went well, with fewer casualties and destruction, perhaps so. Does Israel invite non-Hamas Palestinians from the southern portion of Gaza to return? Does it give Hamas safe passage out, as it did with Yassir Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization when Israel besieged them in Beirut in 1982? If there is widespread destruction and international outrage, perhaps the Israeli government chooses this option. And once Hamas is gone and the threat Gaza posed neutralized, the Israeli government has a lot of soul-searching to do about its failure to anticipate the attack, to respond quickly and to come to grips with how Jewish or secular a nation it chooses to be. Certainly the Netanyahu government faces an accounting.

What of the Palestinians in Gaza? It is true that peace cannot be achieved by the Israeli eradication of Hamas. Peace can only happen when Palestinian leaders are honest with their own people and accept the following, which are all facts on the ground:

• Israel is a Jewish state, and it has a right to exist.
• Because of its long history of violent resistance, a future Palestinian state must be demilitarized, and may not be a base for attacks against Israel.
• Jerusalem will remain a part of (and the capital city of) Israel, while peaceful Muslims will be free to worship at the al-Aqsa mosque complex.
• Eventually, the strong, militarized border between Israel and Palestine may become more like a normal border between normal countries.

That’s it. If the Palestinians had accepted the initial UN offer, they would have had much more, including part of Jerusalem. If they had accepted the Oslo accords in 1993, they might have avoided the walls which now enclose them. If Gazans had not turned to Hamas, they would have avoided the destruction which now engulfs them. At every inflection point, the Palestinian people have made the wrong choice. Here’s a prayer they finally make the right choice now.