I was re-reading what I wrote (here) when Russia invaded Ukraine. It holds up well, I think. There was a brief moment recently when it looked like President Trump might have gotten the sides to negotiate, but that was a mirage, used by Putin to forestall secondary tariffs.
Let’s review the situation, what the various actors want, and how it will play out.
Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to control all of Ukraine. He would prefer to incorporate it into Russia, but he would be willing to settle for a passive client state a la Belarus. He tried nibbling pieces of Ukraine, when he invaded Crimea and parts of the Donbas during the Obama administration. He thought he could blitz his way to Kyiv when he invaded during the Biden administration, but that failed, resulting in the current war of attrition.
Look at the map. Putin has achieved the occupation of almost all the primarily Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. He has established a land bridge to Crimea, augmenting the single overseas bridge which used to be the only connection between Crimea and Russia. His forces in Kherson and Zaporizhzia occupy the eastern bank of the Dnipro river, giving them a defendable line. The Russian Army has eliminated any pockets of Ukrainian activity in Russia, and it is slowly advancing to take the rest of Donetsk province. Ukraine can not stop that advance, only slow it.
Russia has withstood all the sanctions placed on it, which have damaged the Russian economy, but that same damaged economy is producing more drones, more artillery, and more soldiers than Ukraine. While Putin has not realized his overall objectives, Russia is winning the war, and can continue to do so if it chooses. This is why Putin rejects talk of a ceasefire. A ceasefire only helps Ukraine rebound, while a continuation of the current fighting, as costly as it is to Russia, benefits the Russians.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wants to keep his country free, intact, and independent. His army has fought bravely and innovated rapidly, but it cannot evict the Russians from the territory they occupy. The country itself is stuck in transition: it was a corrupt former-Soviet state trying to become a European democracy, but the war has set those goals back. It retains major corruption problems, and even the unity of the war effort is barely enough to hold it together. Despite chronic shortfalls in military manpower, Ukraine has never extended its draft to men below the age of 25! Why? Because the government fears widespread draft avoidance and public discontent if it did.
President Zelensky needs time to rebuild his economy, his military, and a functioning government. A ceasefire would do that, and a peace agreement would be better, but only if it comes with some kind of security commitment from NATO, the US, or major European states.
European leaders want to put a stick in the ground to contain future Russian aggression, correctly fearing that if Putin feels he has “won,” he’ll try again for more. They have already committed to major increases in defense spending (without identifying how they will pay for it), added Sweden and Finland to NATO’s protective canopy, and given billions in aid to Ukraine. The one remaining question for them is do they collectively have the fortitude to stick with their commitments (when the bills come due in terms of a military draft or reduced social spending)?
President Trump desperately wants a Nobel prize; he has publicly admitted it, and it clearly animates his many recent negotiations. He wants to be able to stop spending money and sending equipment to Ukraine, which is in his opinion, Biden’s fault. He wants to drop sanctions and sign a big economic deal with Russia. Putin sees an economic deal with America as the end of sanctions and a chance to recharge his economy.
Putin has raised all kinds of secondary issues. He demands limits on Ukraine’s military, but I suggest this is a negotiating ploy: Putin knows the Ukrainian military is as large as it is going to get. He asks that Ukraine recognize Russian as a second national language and permit the Russian Orthodox Church to operate freely. This is public posturing, to look like he’s defending “Mother Russia” while not really asking for anything of substance. The only import to these conditions is they will be what Putin cites when he decides Ukraine has reneged on the peace deal and he chooses to invade, again.
So how and when will these competing desires work out? When it comes to timing, I believe the when is probably within the next six months. Putin is in no hurry, as his forces are advancing on the final portion of Donetsk province, so he can await their eventual victory or gain the territory by negotiating.
Despite the pleas from Kyiv that it cannot negotiate away any territory, it will do so. If the US, Europe, and Russia build an agreement all three can accept, President Zelensky would find himself unsupported if he used his constitution to deny it. That may sound sad, but it’s true. Ukraine will cede the rest of the Donetsk and all the land Russia already occupies, in exchange for very little. Some military experts point out that such an exchange would cost the Ukrainian Army a defensive belt that is currently holding the Russians at bay; that is true, but new defenses can be built. In the end, the strategic consideration to get a peace agreement will override the military’s operational objection. Whether the Russian occupation is recognized by anyone remains an open but unimportant question (to Russia).
Back in “college,” I had a European history professor who was known for his classroom theatrics, wandering the classroom and alternating between a whisper and a shout. I will never forget his lesson on Yalta, the WWII conference that divided up Europe among the Allied powers. “Did FDR give up eastern Europe at Yalta?” he whispered near my desk. Again, slightly louder, “did the allies legitimize the Communist occupation at Yalta?” A long pause, then a thunderous, “NOOOOOOOOO! The Red Army legitimized it. They took it. You can’t GIVE UP what someone else already HAS!”
Europe will give Ukraine security guarantees; perhaps the United States will also. Why would Putin roll off his current demand prohibiting such support? Because Ukraine has had them before. Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister John Major confirmed Ukraine’s security in the Budapest agreement in 1994 (Russia too!). President Obama ignored it when Putin took Crimea and started to invade the Donbas the first time in 2014. French President François Hollande and Germany’s Angela Merkel mediated the Minsk agreement, which failed to stop the fighting again. President Biden warned Putin not to invade in 2022, and we know how effective that was. Putin doesn’t believe that Europe or the US is willing to fight Russia over Ukraine. He will bide his time and seek to change the government in Kyiv through other means, knowing that some time later, he can always resume the military option.
Why have so many American and European leaders been so lukewarm about Ukraine in this conflict? First, as a post-Soviet state, it has been a mix of democratic aspirations, repression, and corruption. That’s not meant to be as harsh as it sounds. Media have made Ukraine the “good guys” in this war, and that they are. But before that, Ukraine was struggling with poor governance, corruption, and a lot of Russian meddling.
Second, from a geostrategic perspective, Ukraine is not as important to NATO or Europe as it is to Russia. Remember that not long ago, Ukraine was a reliable, post-Soviet ally of Russia, much like Belarus is today. Part of Putin’s ire was sparked by the Maidan revolution, which chased Russia’s puppet leaders in Kyiv back to Moscow. Oh, and Putin’s great disgust with Hillary Clinton goes back to her support (as US Secretary of State) for that revolution. President Obama and Secretary Clinton had offered a “reset” with Russia, then they promoted the Maidan revolution which belied their “reset” claims in Putin’s mind. Mind you I am explicitly NOT agreeing with this Russian interpretation (they’re wrong), just stating it as Russia’s view of the history.
True Story: In March 2009, Secretary Clinton presented Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov with a small red button ostensibly labelled “reset” in Russian, signalling a desire to improve US-Russian relations. Lavrov pointed out that perhaps the Americans needed better translators, as he said the button was actually the Russian word for “overcharge.”
In the end, if Russia had a client state in Ukraine, it would greatly extend its border with NATO, but only to what it had been in 2009. And the addition of the Russo-Finish border is a far more significant factor.
Finally, the outcome of this war is only symbolically important. If Russia “liberates” the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine, or if it eventually installs a puppet government in Kiev (reverting to Russian spelling), the important point is what Europe is prepared to do about it. If Europe goes through with their stated intentions to man, re-arm, and integrate their military capabilities, Russia will be hard-pressed to push further, much like NATO deterred the far more powerful USSR. If Europe’s leadership falters, or fails to follow through, Putin or his successor will almost certainly choose another victim nation to seize.
The war in Ukraine, for Ukraine, will have to end soon. It is decisive for Ukraine, but not for Europe (and certainly not for the United States). It is only a precursor to a larger competition in Europe, for Europe.
The sad thing about realpolitik is that sometimes the outcome is offensive to our sensibilities. That doesn’t make it any less real. “For as long as it takes” was never much of a strategy for US involvement.