In late May and early June of 1940, the German army blitzed across France. The speed and violence of the panzers and stukas left a beleaguered British Expeditionary Force and some remnants of the once-proud French army surrounded along the coast at the tiny port of Dunkirk. Over the period of eight days, the British navy, merchant marines, and thousands of individual ship owners conducted an improvised, hasty withdrawal-under-fire. They rescued over 330,000 soldiers, albeit with nothing more than the soaking wet uniforms on their backs. It was a humiliating defeat, but one tinged with a tiniest glimmer of hope, which was sorely needed by the British people at that point. Prime Minister Churchill reminded his nation that “we must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations.”
The American experience in Kabul these days has me thinking of Dunkirk.
First off, the President continues to defend his decision to end the “war in Afghanistan.” This statement demonstrates his fundamental lack of understanding. Afghanistan was a theater of war: just one of many. While it is possible to surrender a theater in order to win a larger war, one must always remember that there is a larger war on. We did not start this war. Radical Islamic terrorists declared war on the US back in the 1990’s. We ignored them at the time, like a much-older brother ignores the taunts of a much-younger sibling. But like that sibling, the terrorist movement grew-up, and when they knocked down the towers, the game was on.
The US could not have cared less about Afghanistan or the Taliban but for their harboring Al Qaeda (AQ). When the Taliban refused to turn AQ over to us, they became another campaign in the war. And as I continue to remind, we can not declare that war over: only the loser can. So we can end the war tomorrow by admitting our evil, renouncing our ways, and publicly proclaiming the Shahada (“I bear witness that none deserves worship except Allah, and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.”). It really is that simple.
Secondly, I hear much soul-searching about ‘where we went wrong’ in Afghanistan. A few misguided souls says we should never have gone in; I won’t dignify that view with a critique. For the record, I was in favor of going in to Afghanistan to expel the Taliban and root our AQ. BUT, I was also in favor of a cold-hearted, realpolitik approach. Turn the “nation” of Afghanistan over to various regional warlords with this simple admonition: those who fight the Taliban and kill AQ will receive our funds, those who don’t will receive our bombs. Let them fight it out and install whatever puppet-regime the Afghan people could stand in Kabul. Yes, this would have made for atrocities and corruption and human rights violations, but thus was it ever in the Hindu Kush. At least we would be at a distance, and not directly involved in a place where our only interest was the absence of AQ.
When President Bush decided to expand the mission in Afghanistan to nation-building, I thought it was ill-advised but not impossible. I do not understand the logic of those who say “the US can’t do nation-building.” History will long remember our excellent examples in nation-building: Germany and Japan. We took two of the most militaristic cultures of the twentieth century and turned them into committed pacifists barely able to staff military forces (or in Japan’s case, even call them an “army.”) We took nations literally burned to the ground and rebuilt them into economic powerhouses which eventually rivaled us. This took decades to accomplish, even though we had fought a savage war against each.
Bu the best comparative examples for US nation-building are Vietnam and Korea. In the first case, we quit, with predictable results for South East Asia. In the latter case, we stayed. Now somewhere I hear a reader crying “Pat, you can’t be comparing Afghanistan with today’s South Korea!” and to that reader, I say “You’re right; I’m not.” But Afghanistan at year twenty IS comparable to South Korea in 1971. Let me refresh your memory: the Asia Times described South Korea in 1971 as a “Lost Land, . . . a gritty, poverty-racked, unsophisticated nation that was one decade into an industrialization program that would lead to riches.” It varied between democratic leaders, oligarchs, and an occasional military coup. During the previous twenty years, North Korean forces attacked the US and South Korea, killing our soldiers and marines. They continued doing so for the next twenty years.
Now I am not saying Afghanistan was on the path to similar success. But anyone who says we can’t do nation-building is wrong, and anyone who says Afghanistan would never have made it has to explain why South Korea did. Impoverished nation? Check. No democratic culture or history? Check. Pervasive external threat? Check. Persistent US military casualties? Check.
Thirdly (yes, I’m still counting), the President and other senior leaders have said “the Intelligence Community (IC) did not predict such a sudden collapse.” Without having been in the room, I know this is true. It is also a red herring: the IC does not predict anything. Prediction is the realm of prophets and seers, not intelligence professionals. I guarantee you that the IC did consider the possibility of such a scenario and included it as a worst-case one. How do I know that? Because if they didn’t, the President and others would have said as much and fired those responsible. He didn’t (fire them), so they did (cover it).
Likewise, my fourth point is a question. Given that the President has warned for days of a terrorist attack (meaning the IC had good info that an attack was imminent), and given that we remain at war with the Islamic State, and given that the Islamic State is the sworn enemy of the Taliban: why did we wait? Why didn’t we attack the Islamic State in Afghanistan before they attacked us, in order to perhaps disrupt their planning? We didn’t suddenly determine they are our enemy. Nor did we suddenly figure out where ISIS is in Afghanistan. Did we think the Taliban cared? Why the delay? Inquiring minds want to know.
On a tangentially-related, fifth point, who is advising the President on his messaging? Having him stare into the camera and intone “we will not forgive; we will not forget. We will hunt you down and make you pay” is not intimidating. He shuffles on and off stage. He squints at the teleprompter, which is not atop the camera, so it looks at times like he is not speaking to the audience. Either dim the klieg lights, enlarge the size of the font, or get him contacts/glasses. His speech is halting, and no, this is not his well-understood stutter. Joe Biden has been a public figure for well-nigh fifty years. He never was this forgetful, or confused, or halting. Assuming he is still in command of his faculties (and God help us if he isn’t), why are his handlers insisting on putting him in such a bad light?
Sixth and finally (I know, you’re relieved!), the President most recently said he is following the advice of his senior military commanders. This is always re-assuring to hear. The problem is no competent military officer would ever suggest that we conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of unknown size, from a toe-hold perimeter around a civilian airport in an urban area. Someone made a decision to pull the military forces out first. Someone made a decision to evacuate the US Bagram airbase first. Someone made the decision not to accelerate the visa application process. There are reasons why such decisions might have been made: they are not blatantly stupid decisions. But someone made them. Those persons must be identified and given the opportunity to explain themselves, or suffer the consequences if their explanations do not suffice. Blanket admissions of where the buck stops are irrelevant. Who made the decisions?
Dunkirk is an interesting footnote in the history of World War II. It was not decisive in a military sense. The British could afford to equip and field another army. It was the channel, the Royal Navy, and the brave few pilots of the Royal Air Force whose “finest hour” thwarted any ambitions Hitler had of parading past Buckingham Palace as he had down the Champs-Élysées. But it was the snatching-of-a-small-victory-from-the-jaws-of-defeat that helped stiffen the English spine for the dark days ahead. During this brief period, Churchill gave a series of impassioned speeches in the House of Commons which are long remembered: “their finest hour” “blood, toils, tears, and sweat” and finally “we shall fight on the beaches, . . . .” Such is the stuff of legendary leadership.
We are still in a generational war against radical Islamic terrorism. We’ve had a Dunkirk moment, one of our own making. President Biden explained his decision to withdraw from Afghanistan by asking how many more casualties should we endure? He is now responsible for more casualties in one day than the US experienced in the prior two years. I am still waiting for what is his strategy for the larger war. And for when he will stiffen our spines for the fight.