Where we are in the Iran War

Whether you think it was inevitable (as I did), avoidable for the moment (as most do), or completely uncalled for (really? what was your solution?), the US is at war with Iran. If you follow the legacy media closely, you might think America is at the edge of disaster. If you listen closely to the Commander in Chief, you might think we won the war several times already. Here’s a steady assessment, with some historical perspective thrown in.

The US and Israel achieved strategic surprise. It’s amazing, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran declared war on both at its inception almost fifty years ago. But the Israelis focused on closer, more immediate threats and bided their time; the United States chose to ignore the bellicose language, the hostages, the terrorist attacks, as only a superpower can choose to do. It all became so routine that Tehran’s negotiators actually thought they could show up and figuratively tell the US to “shove it” and go home smiling. It didn’t work, and they were surprised. Not sorry.

The US and Israel made a conscious choice to fight this war alone. No one was warned, no one was consulted, no UN imprimatur sought, despite the fact a war with Iran has consequences all over the world. This was a not uncommon practice for the Israelis, who increasingly see a world antagonistic to their very existence (note the spread of “from the river to the sea” rhetoric). It was very unusual for the United States. Usually we at least give our friends and allies a heads-up. In this case, we expected them to take a pass on participating, so it appears we treated them as NPCs (non-player characters, as in video games). The President should not have been surprised when the allies he treated thusly chose to criticize the war and refuse to assist. However, I will add that in the long history of ruffled US-NATO relations, there is only one time NATO countries have refused the US overflight rights, and that was only France and Spain (both quasi-NATO members at the time) during Reagan’s Libya bombing in 1986. For so many countries to do so this time represents an escalation on their part, and will have repercussions. No one can fault a NATO member for refusing to let us use US bases for bombing runs, but to deny airspace? Too far.

The US and Israel have achieved air supremacy over Iran. We are flying hundreds of sorties a day, in daylight, with minimal losses. We have deployed airframes like the venerable B52 and the inestimable A-10, which should never be used where surface-to-air missiles systems are coordinated and integrated. During the search and rescue effort for the downed F15E crew member, there is verified footage of a US aircraft refueling two helicopters at low altitude over Iran. You don’t do that where there is any kind of remaining air defense threat.

But what about that F15E? The A-10 which limped home to a crash landing? The helicopters which took fire and perhaps casualties during the rescue? Air supremacy doesn’t mean “nothing bad can happen” (except perhaps in President Trump’s mind). In my days in camouflage, we used to joke that a well-placed rock can take down a Huey (helicopter), and it wasn’t really an exaggeration. And all militaries are familiar with something called small arms air defense: the notion you take all your various “guns,” aim at a single point in the sky ahead of an aircraft, and let the pilot fly into a wall of lead, where something bad will happen. “Big sky, little bullet” is a refrain every pilot hears and fears. What does air supremacy look like? Twenty thousand sorties and two aircraft shot down, that’s what. Comical fact: right now, the Iranians have tallied two kills, the US has destroyed two of its own, and Kuwait has three kills of US aircraft (apparently it’s quite easy when shooting at your own side)!

Iran’s missile launching and production capabilities have been greatly reduced. About a third of the launchers have been confirmed as destroyed, and another third are assessed as out of action/buried. The latter can be recovered, but it’s not like we aren’t watching and waiting for Iran to attempt to do so. So they have one-third as many launchers available as they did before the war. While there aren’t details out publicly on the missile production facilities, we have been hammering them for weeks now. Note this has little effect on the total number of missiles they retain. While we know where their largest stockpiles were, missiles can be temporarily hidden in many places, which is why it’s best to focus on launchers. Missiles without launchers are static displays, not weapons.

What about the Iranian missile attacks throughout the region? The last German V1/V2 rocket attacks happened in late March 1945, about five weeks before their surrender. You can keep firing rockets and missiles right up until the end. Look at the rate of firing, which has decreased about 90%. “Oh, but Iran is holding back, waiting for the US to exhaust its interceptors” some experts say. These same experts claim Iran is in an existential war. You don’t hold back in an existential war. More likely, their command structure is fragmented, and their targeting capability is limited or non-existent. Evidence of my assertion? They don’t fire salvos designed to overwhelm any site’s defenses, they fire small numbers of missiles at widely diverse targets, from Turkey to Saudi to Diego Garcia (note to those who claim Iran doesn’t have longer-range missiles: Rome is closer to Iran than Diego Garcia). They seems to be throwing a missile here or there, hoping one hits home. They don’t fire accurately: either we are spoofing their guidance system or it isn’t good. Look at what they hit: buildings in cities, or a sprawling petro-chemical complex, especially for their longer-range missiles. Even when we mistakenly bombed two schools, the missiles hit exactly where they were aimed.

If Iran wanted to send a war-winning message, it would salvo a hundred missiles from different launch sites at a single Arab petroleum facility on the Gulf, destroying it. That would be a message. They don’t, because they can’t. Their missiles, like Germany’s buzz bombs, provide terror, not military useful capability.

What about those drones? What role have they played? Attack drones weren’t much of a thing back in my days in uniform, but clearly they are a major combat factor today (see Ukraine). Like any applied military technology, drones are in the period where they seem unstoppable: cheap to build, easy to operate, difficult to defend against. The countervailing capabilities have not yet matured, but they will. In the end, drones may prove to be Iran’s most versatile and effective weapon. But that weapon is no guarantor of success, tactically, operationally, or strategically. Like their missiles, they have shown no operational plan for employing drones, nor a strategy.

Iran’s Navy is gone. Yes, they still have small speedboats they could use to attack undefended tankers, but those are suicide missions with any naval or air protection. They can lay mines, but that again becomes a suicide mission over time, and mines are only an obstacle, they don’t close the strait permanently. Iran has some area-denial capability with shore-based anti-ship missiles, which the US is apparently moving toward targeting. But that involves launchers and missiles and fire control, all very target-able assets. These small boats, mines and missiles are not insignificant capabilities, but they present a very routine challenge to naval operations, and I trust the US Navy is capable of confronting them.

Iran has established effective control over the Strait of Hormuz. As others have pointed out and I can confirm, this outcome was considered and planned for in every Iran scenario on the books. Why was the Trump administration then surprised by it? Simple. All those scenarios started with Iran declaring the strait closed with a missile strike on a tanker or by mine-laying. Then the US declares the strait closed to all Iranian fuel exports, and the Iranian economy collapses and the war is over. That is why closing the strait never seemed much of a real threat; it’s much like the sheriff scene in Blazing Saddles.

Why did it work this time? I don’t know whether whoever is remaining in charge in Iran just got lucky or was very shrewd, but the Trump administration never shut off Iran’s exports. Instead, they removed restrictions on the sale of Iranian oil, providing a temporary boon. Why? Because they feared the spike in oil prices that would result. Now before you climb high on your rhetorical horse and call this the stupidest thing you have ever heard, let me ask you this: who has the EU given more money to since Russia invaded Ukraine over four years ago: Russia, or Ukraine? In those four years, the EU has sent Russia over US$220 billion dollars for oil and natural gas, and sent Ukraine US $200 billion in all forms of aid. Oil and gas prices make nations do crazy things.

While the President has correctly insisted gas prices will return to normal once the war is over, there is little benefit in trying to hold them down while prolonging the conflict. Why he hasn’t taken (or destroyed) Kharg island or closed the strait to Iranian tankers is a strategic mystery.

Have Russia and China been the big-winners so far? No, and those suggesting so are practically cheer-leading for the mullahs. Could those countries benefit in the long run? Of course, if the US fails miserably. So far? Iran is probably not sending quite so many drones to Russia as it needs to keep them for itself. And their production facilities are under direct attack. Likewise, China provided Iran advanced military air defense equipment which has proven worthless. Neither China nor Russia can do anything to stop the American action, and much like the case with Venezuela, Xi and Putin are standing there with–ahem–their things in their hands, looking impotent, while a potential ally falters. And while the American campaign is no doubt straining our munitions supply, Ukraine indicates there has been no reduction from the US side to it thus far.

“War Crimes.” It’s perfectly normal for your enemy to claim your attacks are war crimes. It’s even normal for human rights experts to make the same claim. The first group wants you to stop, and the second views all warfare as inherently evil. It is permissible to strike infrastructure as a legitimate war target, as long as the strike has a military purpose. If we strike a hospital’s back-up generator, that would be a war crime, as its power is solely for a hospital, a protected target (unless of course the enemy builds a headquarters in the basement). If we strike the power substation that supplies power to the local IRGC unit and the hospital, that’s not a war crime. Finally, all war crimes require either intent (you meant destroy what you destroyed) or negligence (you should have known what you destroyed). A missile that misses its target or is targeted incorrectly is not a war crime.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions are real and even reinforced as long as the mullahs and IRGC remain in power, but their progress has been suspended. Here is the entire history of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in a nutshell: their Supreme Leader made a statement forbidding possession of a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, they engaged in decades of behavior that could only result in a nuclear weapon. When called out, they negotiated limits and inspections, then cheated, lied, and denied. They have been criticized, censured, embargoed, threatened, and expelled and still refused to stop (except vocally). They fully believe none of the current attacks would have happened if they had consummated their quest, and they are correct. For the time being, Iran’s nuclear countdown clock has been defused, but no one is sure how much time was left on the timer: it may have been weeks, it may have been a year. If they are forced to give up their enriched uranium and accept real inspections, the clock may be reset.

Why does this matter? Even if Iran gets the bomb, and builds an ICBM, don’t we have sufficient forces to deter them launching one at the US? Yes, we do, and as we are the “Great Satan,” they have little doubt we will nuke the crap out of them if they try. But the problem is elsewhere: the Gulf Arab states, Europe, and especially Israel. If Iran goes nuclear, the Gulf states will insist on the same. Many believe Saudi Arabia already has a back-up plan with China or Pakistan or India to drop a line of credit and “buy” an instant nuclear capability. European countries are talking tough about defending against Russia, but they can’t even summon the will to ensure their oil and gas gets out of the Gulf; they would be open to Iranian intimidation. And that leaves Israel. I put the odds at fifty-fifty that some future Mullah Supremo in Tehran decides he will go down in the history books as the one who eliminated the Jewish race. What did the world mean when it said, “never again?”

The Middle East has been a thorn in America’s side for fifty years. A nuclear-armed Iran makes it a gaping chest wound, not a thorn. Which is why I think this war was inevitable. Inevitable doesn’t mean this was the right time to launch it, though. The necessity for surprise and the opportunity to kill the majority of Iran’s leadership in a single strike proved to be the driving force behind “why now.” Was that a good rationale?

Will the elimination of most of Iran’s leadership lead to an even worse set of leaders, or perhaps regime change? This really is the key question behind the war rationale. At its most basic, consider this: the current (dead) leadership killed more Americans, took more hostages, violated more international norms, ignored more American threats, sponsored more terrorists, suffered more international approbation, and killed more of its own people than any other country in the last fifty years. What exactly is going to come around that is “worse?” Just-as-bad is possible, maybe even probable, but worse? So a once-in-their-lifetime chance to send that top group collectively to Allah? Priceless.

What about a possible regime change? It’s not likely, at least in the short term. Everyone in the leadership pipeline is IRGC or radical mullah, so it’s naive to hope for the long-sought, never-discovered “Iranian moderates.” Tehran has proven capable of shooting unarmed female marchers in the head and hanging teenagers for protesting. They will not go down without a fight, because they know with certainty the retribution which awaits them. While a peace-loving, democratic Iran would be a wonderful thing, the US doesn’t even need that. We only need an Iran that fore-swears nuclear weapons (with requisite checks because of past bad behavior), does not sponsor terrorism, and does not threaten freedom of passage in the Gulf. They don’t have to like the Gulf Arab states or Israel, they just have to stop trying to kill them. That’s all the change we require.

What happens next? The war has plateaued just short of the “hell” President Trump twice (or was it thrice?) threatened. It will not resolve without some further escalation. To the regret of my air-power enthusiast friends, this war will disprove (one again) the idea you can win a war by aerial bombing. The slowest, safest next step is to establish a naval blockade of Iranian exports, seizing them à la Venezuela. The problem here is that it’s very slow and time consuming.

If the US chooses a slightly faster approach, we could use the Marines to conduct raids or clearing operations on the smaller islands in the strait, limiting-but-not-eliminating Iran’s control. It would also serve as a point of pride to occupy Iranian territory and take prisoners. These islands are sparsely inhabited and defended, so the Marines could make short work of them. The same can be said for raids on anti-ship missile locations on the Iranian mainland. Again, not completely decisive, but tightening the noose, so to speak.

The faster and most decisive move is to concentrate the Marines and airborne soldiers on taking Kharg island. The IRGC cannot hold it against those forces for long. Control of that island results in control of around seventy-five percent of Iran’s oil exporting capability. Iran could destroy their own infrastructure, but again, that’s suicidal. Likewise, bombing our forces there has the same result, as Iran’s missiles and artillery aren’t accurate enough to do otherwise. This option goes back to the “game-over” strategy that ended all those Iran wargames in the Pentagon. Our forces there could prove to be a magnet for Iranian drones, missiles, and artillery, but that of course means they have to come out and play in a fairly limited area of the Iranian mainland across from the island. Taking Kharg is messy (as in casualties and destroyed infrastructure) but it’s effective.

And of course a negotiated settlement is always available. But for the US to claim this “excursion” was worth it, we require an iron-clad “no nukes” pledge backed up by independent inspections, free navigation for the strait of Hormuz, and probably a commitment to stop supporting terrorist proxies. I say probably on the last one because the Israelis have gone a long way to ending this problem. If Iran wants a limited end to hostilities, these should be the terms. if they want more, like out of sanctions and back into the community of nations, ending their threats to the Gulf Arab states and Israel are also a must, as well as limiting their ballistic missile efforts and terrorist proxies.

The United States isn’t asking for much: stop acting like an unhinged death-cult. We really have few gripes with Iran, while they have many with others.